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30 October 1974

NO FOREIGN DISSER

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT

: Status of East-West MBFR Proposals

Synopsis (for possible SRMR use)

MBFR has entered its second year in Vienna with the East and West still at loggerheads. This anniversary article compares the basic proposals of the Warsaw Pact and NATO and the key modifications of positions presented in the various MBFR fora.

Article

Since the East and West tabled their MBFR proposals in November 1973, there has been considerable movement but little substantive change in the positions of the Pact and NATO. This article compares, at the top of each column, principal proposals in the Soviet Draft Agreement of 8 November 1973 and NATO's Framework Proposal of 22 November 1973 and, at the bottom of each column, amplifications to these positions presented in multi-and bilateral discussions during the last three and one-half sessions.

A. THE REDUCTION AREA

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Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, West Germany, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.*

Fact spokesmen have made it clear that if NATO attempts to get Hungary involved in the reductions the Pact

Same. The question of including Hungary in the reduction area remains open.

NATO has not pushed the Hungarian question during the course of the MBFR sessions.

^{*} The US, USSR, UK, Canada, and the above seven countries are the chief MBFR participants. Bulgaria, Italy, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Momania, and Turkey are present essentially as observers, although WMTO reserves the right to call for the full participation of Hungary.

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will raise the question of Italian participation.

Although France also maintains forces in the NGA, NATO has formally stated that no MBFR measures will apply to such forces.

B. WHOSE FORCES, HOW MUCH, AND WHEN

Those of all states in the area, plus Soviet, American, British, and Canadian, in all phases.

1975: 20,000 men with arms and equipment.

1976: 5 percent of forces and

armaments.

1977: 10 percent of forces and

armaments.

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During the course of the negotiations the East has modified its original 20K position, by advancing in Session 4 a formal proposal that the US and USSR reduce by 10K each in the first half of 1975, that in second half of '75 the FRG and Poland reduce 5K each and the remaining 5K on each side be divided among the other direct participants. Sov Rep Khlestov said this agreement would specify amounts and types of equipment and should include ground and air forces, including units armed with nuclear weapons.

Although Pact spokesmen have criticized the NATO common ceiling proposal, some Soviet ficers briefly expressed interest in early 1974 in ceilings of roughly 800,000

Phase One: A Soviet tank army, consisting of 5 divisions including about 68,000 troops and 1,700 main battle tanks; 29,000 US troops (about 15 percent of USSR and US ground force manpower).

Phase Two: Reductions necessary to reach a common ceiling for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, illustratively set at 700,000. Allocation of NATO reductions to be decided by NATO.

The West has modified its original proposal during the course of negotiations and has advanced the possibility that (1) there would be no increase of NATO or Warsaw Pact ground forces between Phase One and Two; (2) that US and Soviet reductions in Phase One would be followed by the second phase reductions after a "fixed period of time", (3) that Phase One reduction would be subject to review after a reasonable period of time, (4) that non-US NATO participants (except Luxembourg) would reduce their forces in the second phase.

(The US has recently decided that American and Soviet forces should participate in the second phase reductions.)

The Exercise of the Contract

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NATO vs. 850,000 Pact, including air forces.

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The total reduction of NATO is not to exceed 10 percent. The second phase reductions should not produce any subceilings on non-US NATO forces.

C. WHAT KIND(S) OF FORCES

Ground and air forces, withdrawn as units with equipment, including nuclear weapons. Each side should reduce by units which are roughly similar in nature.

On occasion, Pact spokesmen have suggested that a first step might apply only to ground forces, and that air and nuclear reductions might be deferred. They have expressed a particularly strong desire to reduce the West German army, possibly including reserves.

According to Sov Rep Khlestov, the total manpower to be withdrawn would be divided on a percentage basis among the participants. Then units with approximately the same characteristics and equipment would have to be found on the two sides to make up the total. The Czechs have stated that the equipment reduced should be roughly equivalent in type, even to the level of an APC for an APC.

Polish diplomats have expressed the opinion that USSR might agree to withdraw 5 divisions but not a tank army as such.

Ground forces only; US permitted to take reductions either as units or individuals,* but Soviets reduce tank army.

There has been discussion within the private councils of NATO on a US proposal to reduce, in addition to the above, some of the US nuclear support to NATO presently located in the reduction area. The form of the nuclear reduction proposal (called "Option III" and currently placed in abeyance by the US) includes reductions of up to 1,000 nuclear warheads, 27 Pershing missile launchers, and 48 F-4 nuclear capable aircraft. The British and West Germans are apprehensive over introduction of this nuclear option.

NATO currently has several air manpower questions under consideration—the inclusion of air manpower in the proposed "no increase" agreement which would limit Alliance and Pact manpower between phases, the possibility of withdrawing up to 15 percent

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^{*} The US has recently decided that American reductions in phase one may be in the form of predesignated units and has excluded from its reduction package US forces in Berlin.

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of US and Soviet air manpower in phase one, and the possible inclusion of air manpower within a manpower common ceiling provide the Pact agrees to the common ceiling concept.

D. DISPOSITION OF REDUCED STATIONED FORCES

Such forces shall be withdrawn to within their national boundaries. Specific provision that equipment of such forces should not be stored in the reduction area.

In addition to repeating the above, Soviet diplomats have stressed that withdrawn units will not be moved to Hungary or Bulgaria since such transfers are not permitted by the treaty provision that they must return home. Movement of withdrawn armored units to the Caucasus has been described as unlikely in view of the terrain.

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Such forces should be withdrawn from the area.

Although NATO wants Soviet personnel and equipment to be withdrawn to the USSR, it wants to be able to store US equipment in the reduction area in order to facilitate the rapid return of forces (and maintain the "Reforger" exercises).

Discussion continues within NATO on means of ensuring that Soviet units withdrawn from the NGA are not redeployed in close proximity to flank states such as Turkey.

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E. DISPOSITION OF REDUCED INDIGENOUS UNITS

Units to be disbanded. Personnel demobilized. Equipment removed from the combat stocks of the armed forces.

Sov Rep Khlestov originally stated that equipment such as trucks might be converted to civilian use and that combat equipment might be destroyed. Later inquiries on this point revealed that two points of view existed within the Soviet delegation as to whether equipment might be transferred from active to reserve forces.

Not dealt with in proposal--to be subject of second phase negotiations.

F. VERIFICATION

The parties will inform each other of the beginning and completion of the measures taken for the reduction of forces. No mention of verification.

Khlestov has stated that verification by national means will be adequate, especially since Soviet draft provides for withdrawals by unit.


Appropriate verification provisions should be agreed upon.

NATO is agreed that national means of verification will be the primary ones, but will also push for some form of international inspection. The question of which measures to seek is presently under discussion within the alliance.

G. STABILIZING MEASURES AND CONSTRAINTS

Parties will not increase in any way the manpower and equipment of the stationed and indigenous

Measures should be negotiated which will build mutual confidence and enhance stability by reducing



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forces in the area, although routine replacement of personnel and equipment is permitted. Parties will not assume any international obligation contrary to the provisions of the agreement.

When NATO raised the subject of stabilizing measures, Khlestov stated that the MBFR talks should concentrate on measures to reduce not stabilize.

A Soviet diplomat has expressed the fear that the West Germans might attempt to circumvent an agreement by deploying forces in France or Italy, i.e., outside the NGA.

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the fear of surprise attack and the risk of misunderstandings arising, for example, from ambiguous military activities. There should also be measures to prevent the circumvention of any agreement.

NATO has proposed the titles of four stabilizing measures, applicable only to US and Soviet forces: (1) preannouncement of movements into the area of reductions, (2) preannouncement of major exercises in the area, (3) limitations on the size, number, and duration of major exercises, and (4) exchange of observers at major exercises. The details of these measures remain to be worked out and NATO retains the option to introduce others accompanying reductions.

European states especially concerned to avoid any interference with future efforts at defense cooperation.

